The political and legal problem of a state of exception, whereby a state deviates from its normal constitutional and legal order in response to a real or perceived emergency, has generated much debate. Critics contend that the use of a state of exception really is an exception that swallows the rule, with the potential to corrode the entire legal order. The first part of this article explores international law"s attempt to put limits upon countries use of state of exception, as enforced by Human Rights Committee of the United Nations. Secondly, the author looks at the broader question of whether or not the U.N., as a super-state, itself uses states of exception, and what, if any, limits are placed upon it.
INTRODUCTION
Who is the Potter, pray, and who the Pot? The Rubaiyat of Omar Khayyam
As an intellectual exercise, any in-depth examination of states of exception is something akin to meditating upon a zen koan. In existing or aspiring liberal democracies, the application of the rule of law is the benchmark of how society is or should be governed. Yet, as Carl Schmitt recognized in the wake of the First World War, and in the midst of a dysfunctional Weimar Germany, certain emergency situations are bound to arise where deviations from (and thus exceptions to) the strict adherence to the rule of law are necessary (to one degree or another) in order to keep society running. Schmitt"s focus upon the exception and its implications has rightly been described as one of his most significant contributions, even by critics who strongly disagree with his conclusions. 1 The implications are indeed somewhat mind-bending. If an exception to the rule of law is necessary, then is the exceptional state a period in disregard or in conflict with the law, or simply a period without law? 2 If the exception is formalized, does it so swallow the rule as to expose a fatal flaw in liberal democracies, inviting dictatorship of the entity or office that decides the exception and/or a perpetual state of exception, or is it a strategic retreat necessary to preserve democracy itself? 3 the UN Security Council, can itself be read as an exception to the normal rights and obligations found in the rest of the charter. The Security Council has used its "exceptional" powers under Chapter VII more and more frequently in recent years, with respect to the use of economic sanctions as well as the use of force (Iraq, Afghanistan, the "war on terror", etc.). Consequently, the issue arises whether the use of such powers should also operate under some kind of restraints, and if so, how would such restraints be enforced. 6 Whether one properly views the UN as a kind of super-state or not, it is apparent that in some specific situations the UN does assume the attributes of a state, most obviously in certain peacekeeping and state building missions. Notable examples of the UN acting as an administrator of territory, and thus like a state, include its missions in Kosovo and East Timor. 7 The issues surrounding the concept of a state of exception in such specific situations will be addressed in a separate article. Moreover, "this a additional formal step may encourage a state to reconsider its decision." is extended in duration, geographically, or in scope. However, the additional notice is not limited to extensions of the emergency, but also encompasses any change to the state of emergency, including its termination. ISSN 2029-0405 VOLUME 3, NUMBER 2 2010
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considerations can achieve is to stimulate international pressure through national and international publicity.
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With the expansion of states" use of emergency powers, particularly as applied to the "war on terror," victims of the abuse of these emergency powers need a more concrete remedy, and recalcitrant states need harsher penalties.
Succinctly put:
[S]tates should not continue to enjoy the respect that ratifying human rights treaties bestows, where there is persistent failure to honor the obligations therein. As it stands, the derogation procedure, although seriously flawed, remains the only method of regulating emergencies in international law. It is imperative that the international monitoring bodies step up to the mark in ensuring that states cannot continue playing the "public emergency" card as a smokescreen for the enactment of draconian legislation and the destruction of rights.
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THE UN AS A SUPER-STATE: THE APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL STATE OF EMERGENCY STANDARDS TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S CHAPTER VII POWERS
Thus far the analysis has focused on international legal standards for the regulation -and limitation -of national state"s emergency powers, to the extent they conflict with human rights obligations, and the UN"s role as an "enforcer" (or at least a monitor) of these standards. But does the UN itself exercise emergency powers, and if so, how (if it all) are they regulated, and by whom (if by any entity)?
The UN Charter has been described as a kind of constitution for that body.
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That being the case, Chapter VII of the Charter, and Article 39 in particular, can be read as the constitution"s state of emergency clause. 67 As such, it permits the UN to derogate from two critical portions of the Charter, Article 2(4) and (7 Arguably like a domestic executive or president operating under a domestic state of emergency constitutional provision, to a large extent the Security Council "is he who decides the exception", and thus is the sovereign, using Carl Schmitt"s oft-quoted methodology.
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Even more problematic is the lack of restraints on the exercise of this power to "decide the exception." The first aspect of lack of restrains concerns the Security obligations "under any international agreement." This final language was consistent with the drafting commission"s intention not to create an unsettling "rule of general abrogation." 88 Given this legislative history, it has been suggested that since the drafters had an opportunity to specifically indicate that Article 103 would trump states" obligations under customary international law, and declined to do so, this is strong evidence that the narrower current language cannot have such an effect. 89 The counterargument is that since treaties occupy a higher plane in the hierarchy of international law than custom, it would be strange to suggest that
Article 103 prevails over a state"s treaty obligations, but not its obligations under customary international law. At the same time, regional and local tribunals also have the potential to provide a judicial check on the actions of the Security Council. Their conduct, to date, also provides a clue as to the kind of "indirect" review the ICJ may ultimately employ to limit the power of the Security Council in a given case. There are three potential general approaches to local or regional judicial review of the Security
Council"s Chapter VII resolutions. One approach is to find the Security Council"s actions essentially non-reviewable. A second position is one of extremely limited review-the Council"s actions will evade review, unless it violated jus cogens in a particular case. The third approach is in effect the most broad type of review: the Security Council"s authority or power is not directly reviewed by the court, but the manner in which its resolution is carried out by specific member states may be subject to review under the local or regional law applicable to these states. in violation of fundamental European Community law.
The Court of the First Instance (CFI) took the second position outlined above, with respect to its powers of judicial review over a Security Council resolution.
Thus, it ruled that the conduct of the European Council and Commission, together with the enforcing EU member states, towards the plaintiffs, since it is designed to give an effect to a resolution adopted by the Security
Council under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations offering no latitude in that respect, must enjoy immunity from jurisdiction so far as concerns its internal lawfulness save with regard to its compatibility with the norms of jus cogens.
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Applying this rather lofty standard, the CFI concluded that the bare denial of a right of access to the court and associated deprivation of property without due process is a right protected by the standards of jus cogens. 99 However, the CFI ultimately concluded that the defendants" actions did not, in this case, amount to a deprivation of the right of due process as defined by jus cogens. The Security
Council itself had an internal mechanism (a Sanctions Committee) whereby parties whose assets had been seized in accordance with the resolution could have their case re-examined. Moreover, the resolution of the Security Council was not of an indefinite duration, in that the maintenance of such resolutions would be reexamined after a period of 12 to 18 months by the Security Council itself. Given these safeguards, and taking into account the importance of the resolutions to the maintenance of international peace and security, the ICJ found that the plaintiffs" rights under jus cogens were not violated.
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On appeal, the ECJ reversed the decision of the CFI. In so doing, they rejected the arguments of certain defendants that the CFI erred in allowing any kind of review of actions mandated by a Security Council resolution, as well as the 97 In contrast, the defendants in the Kadi case were not acting directly on behalf of the Security Council, nor where they exercising powers directly delegated to them by the Security Council. In any event, and possibly notwithstanding the existence of this distinguishing factor, the ECJ had the authority to review the legality of the Community regulation at issue as an "expression of a constitutional guarantee stemming from the EC Treaty as an autonomous legal system which is 101 Ibid., ¶ 308. 102 Ibid. The Charter of the United Nations, on the other hand, would have primacy over "secondary Community law". Ibid., ¶ 307. 103 Ibid., ¶ 309. 104 Ibid., ¶ 312.
A contrary approach was taken by an English appeals court in the Al-Jedda case. Finally, the plaintiff argued that his claim that his detention violated British common law should be considered and upheld. However, applying applicable choice of law rules, the court concluded that Iraqi, rather than British, law applied to this case, and thus rejected his remaining claims under British law.
The court"s decision in Al-Jedda is more in accord with the CFI"s conclusion in
Kadi. Both courts considered a regional or national tribunal"s role in reviewing the effect of a Security Council"s resolution under Chapter VII as extremely deferential.
The court"s role was limited to ascertaining whether or not the resolution violated principles of jus cogens. To the extent the resolution conflicted with other treaties, such as the ECHR, the treaties comprising EC law, the ICCPR, or customary international law, the resolution prevailed in accordance with Article 103 of the UN Charter.
In this respect, the analysis of the CFI and the English Court of Appeal in AlJedda is more logical than that employed by the ECJ. The ECJ did not explain why EC law, which itself is the product of international treaties, prevailed over a conflicting Security Council resolution given the constraints of Article 103.
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Instead, the ECJ appeared to create an artificial dichotomy with respect to the effect of such resolutions on EC law, depending on whether they created a conflict with EC primary (core human rights, for example) and secondary law. 113 
CONCUSIONS
The UN occupies a dual role with respect to states of exception. On one hand, the UN, through its Human Rights Committee"s enforcement of the ICCPR"s limitations on national states of exception, acts as a kind of guarantor against abuses inherent in the existence of such situations. The legal framework limiting the scope and duration of states of exception is solid and well-developed.
Unfortunately, the HRC"s enforcement powers in this respect are somewhat wanting. While the concept of soft law has many merits, bereft of the possibility of imposing hard sanctions, the HRC as thus far shown an inability to effectively penalize states which flout the ICCPR"s limitations on states of exception. In this respect, even a slight increase of the HRC"s enforcement powers -beyond the ability to issue a damning report -would be welcome. Such increased power could include the capacity to award nominal damages in a given case, perhaps in the range of 5,000-10,000 dollars, along the lines of the ECHR"s awards.
The other side of the relationship of the UN to states of exception is one of a subject: the UN as a super-state, the executive branch of which, the Security Council, has the right to create a state of exception from the normal rules/constitution binding this super-state. Specifically, this is the right to derogate 114 Ibid., ¶ 312. 115 One possible way for a regional or national court to avoid the Article 103 problem would arise in situations where the Security Council resolution gives some discretion to the member state as to how it may be implemented. In that way, the court can legitimately check whether the manner of the resolution"s implementation was in accord with regional or national standards. However, where, as in Kadi, the resolution leaves no such flexibility, this is obviously not an option. 116 While the legal systems in many states are subordinated to international law (i.e., international law prevails over conflicting domestic law), the courts in states which do not take such a position (for example, the United States, where treaties are a source of law, but not necessarily higher than domestic federal law, and in any case not higher than the constitution) may have a logical basis to apply the ECJ"s position in Kadi. Significantly, the conflict between the Security Council resolution and the rights enshrined in a national constitution, for example, would not necessarily implicate Article 103, as the conflict is not with an international treaty. Council"s resolution, rather than a legal challenge on the resolution itself) from the ICJ, or even regional or national tribunals, may be possible.
While some tribunals, such as the ECJ, have been more assertive in placing a judicial limit on the Security Council"s actions, the legal framework in which they have done so has been less than coherent. A better long-term solution would be for the ICJ to assume its natural role as a kind of check on the executive branch of the UN, particularly where the Security Council is exercising its "exceptional" powers under Chapter VII of the Charter. There have been signs that the ICJ is moving towards taking such a role, as evidenced by various dissenting opinions over the years, but this process should itself be accelerated to match the growing assertiveness of the Security Council in response to meeting global threats.
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